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[ POLICY
Navigation making use of advanced technologies, notably involving radio-
waves providing precise information on 
positioning, navigation options and on the 
surrounding geographic environment, has 
become an ever more present phenomenon 
in today’s societies. Needless to say, this 
raises also a number of profound legal 
issues, some more general in nature, 
some more specifi c to the navigation 
sector or even a specifi c subsector 
thereof, alternatively taking on a specifi c 
fl avour once arising in that context.
Amongst those, arguably the issues of 
privacy and protection of data against 
undue interference, respectively liability 
for erroneous positioning, navigation 
or environmental information and any 
damage or loss suffered as a consequence 
of trusting such information, arise as the 
two most prominent and complex ones. 
The present paper therefore represents 
an effort to survey, analyse and evaluate 
these two issues, with a focus on 
international and, as relevant, European 
law as an example of how regional or 
even national law may further – and often 
indeed do – interpret the international 
rules and/or the general principles behind 
them. Beyond such interpretation and 
implementation, after all, most national 
legal systems have their own particular 
regime in place on both sets of issues. 
Navigation from a 
legal perspective
‘Navigation’ in reality is of course a 
multifaceted phenomenon, diffi cult to 
capture in a simple scheme. Nevertheless, 
for the purposes of legal analysis it would 
be very helpful at the outset to outline 
its main distinctive elements, dissecting 
the concept as it were into a few major 
key categories of components. By way 
of a default approach for the purpose 
of allocating the appropriate legal 
obligations, responsibilities and liabilities 
navigation systems at this junction should 
then probably be seen to consist of three 
such major components. How the problem 
of privacy protection would then fi t into 
this scheme, is yet another matter.
The fi rst main component comprises 
the radio-location network, that is the 
physical infrastructure and the hardware 
comprising it which provide the baseline 
services by way of radio-communications 
– satellites emitting signals-in-space, radio 
towers emitting radio signals, or even 
fi xed navigation devices at airports using 
various carriers of electronic messages. 
Sometimes the operation of the physical 
infrastructure is separated from that of 
providing such baseline services over it, 
and sometimes the baseline services are 
augmented by the same provider with, 
for instance, software or information 
updates, but both together represent the 
‘supply side’ of the navigation sector. 
Operators involved on this ‘supply side’, 
whether government agencies active 
to provide services of public interest 
or commercial operators in it for the 
money, are usually covering regions, 
countries or even continents with their 
operations, in efforts to spread the 
public services as broadly as possible 
respectively generate as much revenues 
as possible. Their key tools for achieving 
such aims comprise on the one hand the 
physical infrastructure – which, except 
for satellites1, requires appropriate 
regulation at a national level2 – and on 
the other hand the use of radio waves, 
preferably without undue interference – 
which means communications law, both 
at the national but, as for international 
usage of radio frequencies, very 
profoundly also at the international 
level, is applicable and applied3.
The second main component concerns 
the on-board devices, whether highly 
Arguably the issues of 
privacy and protection 
of data against undue 
interference, respectively 
liability for erroneous 
positioning, navigation 
or environmental 
information and any 
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the two most prominent 
and complex ones
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advanced ones such as on board 
aircraft or ships or far more simpler 
ones, all the way up to those carried by 
mountaineers, hikers, amateur sailors 
and suchlike. Sometimes these devices 
come with the vehicle, sometimes they 
can be bought as stand-alone units to be 
summarily installed in such vehicles – 
or are just carried in hand or backpack; 
but in all cases it is the hardware on 
the ‘demand side’ of the navigation 
equation we are concerned with here.
Consequently, one main important 
legal regime applicable concerns that 
of product liability law; the applicable 
set of laws and regulations to ensuring 
that no ‘unsafe’ products are marketed 
and sold to unsuspecting consumers. 
Such product liability law is by and 
large of a national nature, although 
within the European Union substantial 
efforts  have been made to harmonize 
the national product liability laws of the 
EU member states4. In addition, various 
– always national – legal regimes may 
apply regarding compliance with a priori 
technical standards which certain products 
would have to comply with, or general 
product warranties and guarantees.5
The third component, also operative on the 
‘demand side’ yet usually taken care of by 
a different branch of the sector, concerns 
the (provision of the) software calculating 
positions and providing further navigation 
information, even if sometimes it may 
well form physically part of the on-board 
device, alternatively be provided by the 
infrastructure network (service) provider. 
To the extent this third component is 
subject to legal and regulatory constraints 
and controls, they again would largely 
form part of national systems – this 
time focusing on service warranties 
and guarantees – as well as being in all 
remaining aspects usually dealt with 
by contractual agreements, where ‘the 
law’ usually only provides certain broad 
parameters within which waivers and 
disclaimers are considered allowable.
Two major areas illustrating the relevance 
of such an analysis and of the effort 
to dissect the complex navigation 
environment into a few key categories of 
services and providers, are indeed those 
of privacy and liability. Take, for instance, 
the fundamental risks that information 
on a user’s whereabouts are unduly 
distributed or that the user is provided 
with information which is erroneous 
or even absent at a critical juncture. 
For legal purposes of determining 
responsibility for any violation of privacy 
in such a scenario it is of fundamental 
importance to understand that (contrary 
to public perceptions) GNSS satellites, 
in and of themselves, have no knowledge 
whatsoever of a particular user’s position 
– and can therefore never be held 
responsible for such a violation. If the 
above generic threefold subdivision of 
the navigation sector is to be summarily 
applied, most likely the privacy violation 
would come to be attributed to the 
operator of the third component.
Likewise, if liability for damage caused 
by a user’s trust on navigation information 
which subsequently turns out to have 
been unjustifi ed is to be allocated, it 
should be realized that GNSS satellites, 
so far, do not provide the key positioning 
and navigation information – that is 
done by the on-board device using 
triangulation algorithms, or off-board 
infrastructure using the triangulated 
information communicated by the on-
board device and feeding back the actual 
positioning and navigation information.
To analyse and try to appreciate in 
somewhat greater substance how such 
scenarios are to be approached from a 
legal perspective, it is thus appropriate 
to now address these two concepts of 
‘privacy’ and ‘liability’ a bit more in detail.
Privacy: the defi nition 
and the law
Due to the many legal documents (laws, 
treaties and others) having addressed the 
issue of ‘privacy’ in one way or another, 
many defi nitions of the concept exist, 
some extended, other much more concise. 
For the present purpose however it should 
suffi ce to defi ne the ‘right to privacy’ 
as a ‘right of individuals or groups of 
individuals to seclude themselves and 
limit information about themselves 
becoming publicly available’.6
In real life, this right to privacy falls apart 
in two main categories. The fi rst category 
refers to the problem of ‘Big Brother’: 
governments should abstain from any 
undue interference with an individual’s 
privacy, unless there are clearly overriding 
interests of a public nature, as based 
on non-discriminatory, transparent and 
coherent criteria. The second category 
refers to the problem of ‘paparazzi’, under 
which governments should also protect 
individuals against unjustifi ed intrusion 
into their private life by other private 
persons and/or, following from there, the 
public at large. Finally, it should be noted 
that increasingly the right of privacy is 
also considered to apply to companies 
and other legal entities, not just to natural 
legal persons, read human individuals.7
Legally speaking, the right to privacy 
has been treated as part of the human 
rights catalogue. Thus, the famous 
1948 Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights of the United Nations provided: 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks 
upon his honour and reputation. Everyone 
has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.”8 A 
further UN-initiated international treaty 
of 1966 similarly stated: “1. No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks 
on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone 
has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.”9
These international treaty rules have 
been widely implemented in national 
law. For example, in the United Kingdom 
the 1998 Human Rights Act stated: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a 
public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is 
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necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being 
of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.10
As a matter of fact, this clause exactly 
repeats the text of Article 8 of the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights, 
which thus resulted in a European-wide 
harmonization of at least the defi nition of 
‘(the right to) privacy’, even as individual 
sovereign states remained at liberty to 
apply for instance criminal law sanctions 
and procedures in accordance with their 
respective domestic traditions and laws.
Interestingly, much later in the context 
of EU law it became necessary for the 
issue of privacy to be dealt with from 
quite a different angle, in the context 
of steadily increasing digitalization 
and ‘electronization’ of data, including 
personal data, and the use of internet, 
e-mail and suchlike for exchange of 
and access to data. The approach in the 
European Union was to achieve a fair and 
appropriate balance between the human 
right of privacy, the protection of which 
now required some safeguards in the 
specifi c context of the enormous traffi c 
in electronic data, and the economic 
interests in generally allowing, even 
stimulating such traffi c of and general 
access to data as a major driver of new 
commercial services and activities.
This approach resulted in a key EU 
Directive in 1995, the ‘Data Protection 
Directive’, which was amended and 
updated in 2002 to take into account new 
developments in the ICT realm, which now 
spells out the details of privacy protection 
in the area of electronic data – which, 
as for the navigation sector, includes 
electronic data referring to an individual’s 
precise position or route followed. 
Based on a key defi nition of ‘personal 
data’ as “any information relating to an 
identifi ed or identifi able natural person”,11 
there are three generic categories 
of exceptions to the fundamental 
requirement that whatever takes place 
on electronic networks in terms of data 
transfers and access should not amount to 
infringement of an individual’s right to a 
personal life and privacy. By and large, 
the same or similar exceptions will be 
found in national law regimes in other 
states outside of the European Union 
fundamentally upholding the rule of law 
and protecting human rights – albeit often 
in different versions and variations.
First, the so-called ‘data subject’ may 
provide his consent to the use of specifi c 
electronic data.12 An obvious example in 
the navigation context would be where an 
individual wishes to enjoy specifi c services 
which are related to his specifi c location or 
route. A main condition is that the consent 
should be unambiguous and explicitly, 
knowingly and willingly provided. 
Furthermore, the extent of the consent also 
principally determines the extent to which 
an operator enjoying legitimate access 
to such privacy-related data can actually 
use those data – in other words, the latter 
may not after acquiring access to data 
for one purpose or service then use such 
data also for other purposes or services.
Second, privacy-sensitive data can be 
legitimately accessed and used without 
consent of the data subject only if justifi ed 
by overriding public interests which have to 
be explicitly spelled out in applicable law 
and regulation, limited usually moreover 
to the interests in public order, criminal 
law enforcement and security.13 Naturally, 
those justifi cations only legitimize access 
and use by appropriate governmental 
authorities also as determined by law or 
regulation, not by other governmental 
authorities or any private person or 
entity – and again those data may only be 
used for the specifi c purposes specifi ed 
by the applicable law or regulation.
Third, data which may have privacy-
sensitive content may commonly be 
collected and used for general historical, 
scientifi c and statistical aims and analyses 
– if properly made anonymous, meaning 
that individual data cannot be traced 
back to an individually identifi able 
person or specifi c group of persons.14
Obviously then, throughout the EU 
member states anyone providing 
positioning and navigation services 
should ensure proper protection of data 
regarding the position and navigation of 
individual users, both in a technical sense 
– by developing secure networks and 
data streams – and in a legal sense – by 
ensuring that data subjects are properly 
informed and if necessary have given 
their consent, whereas governmental 
authorities should only be allowed access 
in conformity with specifi c law and 
regulation. Generally, moreover, these 
exceptions to potential infringement of 
personal privacy should be interpreted 
in a narrow sense: protection of personal 
data is the default, access by others 
than the data subject the exception. 
Again, other non-EU domestic legal 
systems respecting the rule of law and 
the protection of human rights would by 
and large follow the same approach.
Liability: the defi nition 
and the law
Liability likewise is a very common 
and often-used concept, hence defi ned 
throughout the ages in myriad fashion. 
For the purpose of the present analysis, 
however, the following defi nition should 
suffi ce: liability is “the legal accountability 
of a person or legal entity to compensate 
for damage caused to another person or 
legal entity in accordance with specifi c 
legal principles and rules”, which 
principles and rules are furthermore to be 
based upon specifi ed sources of law.15
Privacy-sensitive data can 
be legitimately accessed 
and used without consent 
of the data subject only 
if justified by overriding 
public interests which 
have to be explicitly 
spelled out in applicable 
law and regulation
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In other words, liability is not a self-
evident consequence of damage being 
caused to someone, but depends on a 
particular source of law – treaty, act, 
customary law – which is applicable to 
the case of damage at hand, and amongst 
others determines who is liable to whom, 
for what (kinds of damage), and to what 
extent. It determines whether fault liability 
(that is, the victim needs to prove some 
kind of fault has caused the damage before 
compensation can be claimed) or absolute 
liability (that is, the causal link between 
the damage and the defendant is suffi cient 
for compensation to be due) applies, and it 
also determines the level of compensation 
– unlimited or subject to limitations?
As a consequence, also, there are 
many different legal regimes dealing 
with liability, national as well as 
international,16 and in some cases even 
at the level of the European Union. 
At the highest level, three different 
regimes should be distinguished.
First, there is the concept of third-party 
liability, often at the domestic level also 
labelled or comprised within tort liability, 
which is liability for damage caused to 
parties not as such involved in the activity 
in the context of which the damage occurs. 
Such liability by defi nition is regulated by 
law, whether by statute or by customary 
or common law, where each national 
legal system includes such a regime and 
in addition in a number of areas also 
international rules exist. In the absence 
of any legal regime of third-party or tort 
liability specifi cally targeted at navigation- 
or positioning-related damage,17 reference 
could still be had to established general 
principles of law to claim liability.18 
Second, contractual liability, often also 
referred to as inter-party liability, rules 
damage caused by one contracting party 
to another in the context of the activities 
contracted for. By defi nition, this is 
regulated as between those contracting 
parties by way of the applicable 
contract. General law only rarely steps 
in (for example to ensure contractual 
agreements do not violate other laws or 
fundamental principles of morality or 
justice); normally the freedom of contract 
of the parties rules supreme here.
Third, the earlier-mentioned concept of 
product liability represents an exception 
to the above two types of liability, which 
basically apply to damage caused by 
an activity, whereas product liability 
of course focuses on damage caused 
by a particular product in the course 
of normal or reasonable usage.19
For the realm of navigation, the above 
liability-labyrinth essentially means 
that for each case of damage caused in 
the context of a navigation service or 
product, the applicable legal regime(s) 
has/have to be identifi ed, which then 
spell(s) out in detail what damage is 
compensable to what extent by whom 
under which further conditions.20
The GNSS Legal/
Functional Model
To illustrate the resulting complexity 
of the liability situation in particular 
where the involvement of satellites in 
navigation arises, in the context of several 
major advisory projects on Galileo the 
present author has developed a ‘GNSS 
Legal/Functional Model’ to properly 
map the various potentially or actually 
applicable liability regimes in this 
realm. This model could be applied to 
GPS, GLONASS, EGNOS or any other 
relevant satellite navigation context as 
much as to Galileo; equally, it could 
be applied with greater precision and 
in greater detail to specifi c areas where 
GNSS is used – aviation, maritime, 
road, rail, location-based services, 
time stamping, geodesy, et cetera. 
Note of course, that – like any model – 
this is a mere approximation of reality; 
the types of liability specifi ed in the 
legend below should not be seen as 
exclusive, but rather as the ‘normal’, 
most commonly applicable state of 
affairs. Any full-fl edged analysis offering 
comprehensive coverage requires 
the appropriate legal expertise.
This ‘GNSS Legal/Functional Model’ thus 
allows a fi rst level of mapping of specifi c 
liabilities as per specifi c legal regimes 
based on the applicable legal sources, in 
principle for any relationship between 
the various (groups of) stakeholders 
in the navigation environment.
A few illustrations here to 
make the general point. 
First, E in the case of satellite service 
– notably GNSS signal and service – 
providers refers to the aforementioned 
1972 Liability Convention – but 
then only to the extent the damage 
concerned comprises physical damage 
to third-party victims on the ground 
caused directly by the satellites – not 
to any damage resulting from fl awed 
navigation information. Whether any 
regime of suffi cient specifi city applies 
to the latter categories of damage, 
would indeed be highly disputable; 
at best general tort liability principles 
may be applied. Certainly, GPS and 
GLONASS do not accept such liabilities, 
so that the chances of actually getting 
liability acknowledged by a domestic 
court or tribunal and effectively 
being effectuated are rather slim.
Throughout the EU member states anyone providing 
positioning and navigation services should ensure proper 
protection of data regarding the position and navigation 
of individual users, both in a technical sense – by 
developing secure networks and data streams – and in a 
legal sense – by ensuring that data subjects are properly 
informed and if necessary have given their consent
12 | Coordinates May 2015
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Second, where GPS and GLONASS 
operators insist on A being applicable 
vis-à-vis users, no contract of whatever 
nature existing regarding such use 
of GPS or GLONASS signals. This, 
inter alia, means that in aviation GPS 
and GLONASS are not acceptable for 
safety-sensitive signal provision, in the 
absence of any contractual warranties 
or liabilities. International regulation 
as per ICAO simply obliges aviation to 
use navigation aids only if compliant 
with high standards of reliability and 
precision. Any Centre in the aviation 
context – read air traffi c control centres – 
would thus only allow aircraft operators 
to use a GNSS signal under some 
form of contract giving rise to B.
This is precisely one area where Galileo 
intends to make a difference, aiming for 
contracts giving rise to B in appropriate 
circumstances. Against payment, the 
Galileo operator will thus possibly offer 
contractual liability properly speaking 
– for instance for damage caused by 
electronic signals overheating the 
receivers. However, this is not what 
GNSS users are usually most concerned 
with, so the Galileo operator would  also 
be expected to add service guarantees 
and warranties as part of B, specifying 
compensation in case the service fails to 
meet the promised standards, as well as 
guarantees that if fl awed Galileo-based 
positioning- and navigation-information 
would result in onward damage, Galileo 
would accept liability for damage under for 
example D or G, which is indirect damage 
as far as the relationship between the 
signal provider and the user is concerned.
Third, when again taking aviation as 
the example, D covers a broad range 
of international treaties on contractual 
liability of airlines vis-à-vis their 
passengers for damage sustained 
during a fl ight – ranging from a 1929 
Warsaw Convention to a 1999 Montreal 
Convention – which have by and large 
harmonized the national laws of the 
various groups of states parties to the 
respective treaties. In handling damage 
caused by aircraft accidents to third parties 
on the ground, G by contrast comprises, 
at the international level, only a sparsely 
ratifi ed 1952 Rome Convention, later 
amended by a similarly sparsely ratifi ed 
1978 Montreal Protocol, which means 
that in most cases national (tort) law 
applies here, with all variations possible 
as between individual countries.
Obviously, for other modes of 
transportation (interested in) using GNSS 
signals and services, a largely or even 
completely different set of legal regimes 
would elaborate the various letters in 
this GNSS Legal/Functional Model, 
except for the rather generic and separate 
product liability represented by I.
Again, however, for a comprehensive and 
full-fl edged legal analysis more detailed 
knowledge and understanding both of 
how satellite navigation works and of 
any potentially applicable legal regimes 
in a given scenario are necessary than 
can be refl ected in the current overview.
Concluding remarks
As can also be glanced from the GNSS 
Legal/Functional Model – which could, 
with minor changes, be applied also to 
areas such as privacy rights, next to those 
of liability which the version briefl y 
discussed above focussed on – law often 
is simply a matter of common sense: one 
has to look for the applicable relationship, 
and then fi nd the legal sources applicable 
to that relationship, to seek out whether 
liability for damage might be claimed, 
and if so, to what extent, by whom to 
whom and under what further conditions.
The baseline approach for meeting privacy 
concerns in the context of navigation 
operations further to that is that privacy 
in the fi rst place is a matter of consent, 
unless specifi c criminal and/or security-
related law allows for infringement of 
such privacy. In all cases, however, such 
infringements need to be interpreted 
narrowly, and infringement of privacy is 
then only allowed proportionally, that is 
to the extent of the consent respectively 
the applicable provisions in the law.
Similarly, the baseline approach for 
addressing potential liabilities is a matter 
of following the chain of relationships 
between various stakeholders, and 
determining the appropriate regime(s) 
Figure 1: The Galileo Legal/Functional Model and llability in a multi-model context
Legend: A = No (or tort?) liability; B = Contractual liability (possibly including onward liability 
handling); C = contractual liability (normally, except for aviation); D = contractual liability (unless 
overruled by tort liability / national or international law imposing liability regime); E = International 
third-party liability; F = No (? or tort?) liability; G = Third-party liability (usually national, sometimes 
international); H = No liability (normally); I = Product liability as applicable (national or EU law)
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for the appropriate link in the chain. 
Where issues become too complicated 
from that perspective, however, one 
w ould be well-advised to involve a 
lawyer and/or some insurance.
Where, fi nally, in many respects the law 
has not yet dealt at any level of detail with 
navigation-related or -specifi c privacy 
issues or liabilities, not only much work 
remains still to be done in the legal realm, 
but it would be highly advisable for 
any stakeholder in the sector to follow 
and, as far as feasible and justifi able, 
infl uence that process in order to arrive 
in the end at a (much more) logical, 
comprehensive, transparent and balanced 
legal regime allowing navigation to offer 
its benefi ts to mankind and individual 
societies without unduly interfering with 
the right to privacy and whilst taking 
appropriate care of liabilities for damage.
Endnotes
1 With regard to satellites, since the 1960s a 
major body of international law has developed, 
allowing in principle (and then regulating) 
the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, 
most notably by way of the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty. Over a dozen states globally speaking 
have in addition drafted national space laws 
applicable to such operations, usually in 
conformity with this body of international 
obligations – but the overwhelming 
majority has not (yet) undertaken such 
domestic implementation efforts.
2 Thus, each state has for instance regulations 
on the instalment of radio towers for 
cellular telephony on public or private 
grounds. These regimes have not been 
subjected to international treaty obligations, 
partly since the impacts of building a cell 
tower are so much of a local nature.
3 This regime at the international level has 
been developed largely under the auspices 
of the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), most particularly the Radio 
Regulations updated every few years under 
its aegis and the process for allotting and 
assigning radio-frequencies to specifi c 
international communication infrastructures. 
At the national level, each state has not only 
established a domestic legal structure to ensure 
relevant international obligations are complied 
with, but also extensive regulation in place 
concerning radio-communication activities 
that remain of a purely domestic nature.
4 This was fi rst done by way of a 
1985 Directive, which has been 
fundamentally updated in 1999.
5 At the international level, the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
merely acts by way of issuing relevant 
recommendations on standards for ranges of 
products (and services) which may impact 
a particular country’s legal handling of 
product liability (standards), but leaves the 
discretion to do so with individual countries.
6 See e.g. for relevant general and fairly 
succinct yet comprehensive defi nitions 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy; http://
legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
privacy; and http://www.encyclopedia.
com/topic/right_of_privacy.aspx.
7 E.g., in Europe in the 2002 Colas Est 
case companies were considered entitled to 
enjoyment of the right to privacy as well.
8 Art. 12, Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.
9 Art. 17, International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.
10 Art. 8, Human Rights Act.
11 Art. 2(a), Data Protection Directive.
12 Cf. e.g. Art. 7(a), Data Protection Directive.
13 See e.g. Arts. 3(2), 8(4), (5), 13(1), 
Data Protection Directive.
14 See e.g. Art. 6(1)(b), Data 
Protection Directive.
15 E.g. Art. 2, Co-operation Agreement 
On a Civil Global Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS) between the European 
Community and its Member States and the 
State of Israel, Brussels, 13 July 2004.
16 The international regimes usually insist 
that domestic legal regimes are harmonized 
to the extent that the international regime 
in question requires, whilst it remains in 
most cases the national regime which is 
directly applicable to instances of damage.
17 Only in the aviation sector notable efforts 
have been undertaken in the context of the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) to create such a regime for the use 
of GNSS, but these efforts have consistently 
been rebuffed by the actual providers so 
far of operational GNSS services, the 
US and Russian military establishments 
running GPS respectively GLONASS.
18 E.g., in public international law the legal 
principle ‘sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas’ 
holds states liable for harm caused from 
their national territory (in other words, from 
within their legal control) to other states.
19 Cf. also however the aforementioned 
EU Directives of 1985 and 1999, which 
harmonized such domestic regimes 
as for the EU member states.
20 Thus, by way of example the 1972 
Liability Convention spells out that physical 
damage directly caused by a ‘space object’, 
read inter alia a GNSS satellite, to a state 
or its citizens has to be compensated by 
the launching state(s) of that space object, 
without any principled limit as to the 
amount to be compensated and subject 
to a requirement of proof of fault only if 
the damage is sustained by another space 
object; otherwise, absolute liability applies.
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The baseline approach 
for addressing potential 
liabilities is a matter of 
following the chain of 
relationships between 
various stakeholders, 
and determining the 
appropriate regime(s) 
for the appropriate 
link in the chain
14 | Coordinates May 2015
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